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Introduction 1
On 24 March 2009 the British Home Office released a second, revised, edition of their CONTEST Strategy for countering international terrorism. Structured around the four alliterative workstreams of its predecessor -Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare -the document was quickly positioned as an integral part of the state's efforts to, '…reduce the risk to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas from international terrorism,' (HM Government 2009, p.12); a threat that both '…remains and is evolving' (Smith 2009) according to the Home Secretary in her accompanying remarks. The publication of this document offers a timely opportunity for reflecting on the ongoing, struggle against unconventional violence which this article efforts to meet by taking the United States and United Kingdom as critical case studies in this protracted conflict. Although important differences between the two have been identified (Rees and Aldrich 2005, 
see also Guild et

A New Topography of Security
The CONTEST 2 document establishes the rationale for revisiting British counter-terrorism mechanisms by pointing to the emergence of a complex, networked global enemy headed by the al-Qaeda leadership (HM Government 2009, p.11 ). This enemy, readers are informed, has benefitted at once from the development of modern technologies posing new opportunities for proselytisation; the growing popularity of extremist ideologies; and unresolved regional conflicts across the globe (HM Government 2009, p.11) . Tracing, here, academic discussions of the 'new terrorism' that gained considerable currency following 9/11 (compare Burnett & Whyte 2005; Neumann 2009 ), CONTEST 2 explicitly argues that, 'the current international terrorist threat is quite different from the terrorist threats we faced in the past, ' (HM Government 2009, p.11 ).
The grammar of unprecedented insecurity that both frames and legitimises this latest counter-terrorist strategy is an instantly familiar one. From 9/11's immediate aftermath onwards, Western polities have been persistently subject to claims to those events marking a radical transformation in their own prospects of present/future security (Jackson 2005 , Jarvis 2009 ). From Dick Cheney's (2001a) suggestion that, 'the world shifted in some respects', through George Bush's (2001a) claim that '…night fell on a different world', to Tony Blair's (2001) identifying 9/11 as a '…turning point in history' such that 'the kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces are in flux', a powerful trans-Atlantic narrative of 4 Stakeholder Security systemic change in our security environment has been consolidated. In Condoleezza Rice's terms:
September 11 th was one of those rare dates that forever divides history into distinct categories of before and after. Everyone will remember what he or she was doing on September 11 th . It was a day when the dark and impossible became a horrific reality for our country and for the world. We commonly hear the refrain that everything changed on September 11 th . In many ways that is true. (Rice 2001 ).
This repeated construction of 9/11 as a temporal 'interval' (Fortier 1999, p.47 ) separating discrete historical periods has relied on and sustained two related arguments. First, it has positioned those attacks as a tragic harbinger of a 'new and frightening' (Blair 2001) terrorist threat. Viewed thus, a new, incorrigible, type of terrorist enemy determined for maximum casualties now confronts us all as an existential, imminent, danger. Second, this spectre of unprecedented, exceptional, threat serves as a potent justification for radically rethinking security policy at home and abroad; with 9/11 figuring here as, 'a window into our future…where the old methods of deterrence are no longer sufficient -and new strategies and capabilities are needed to ensure peace and security' (Wolfowitz 2001) . Gone now forever, it seems, is the Cold War era of rational, deterrable, foes. Our once familiar adversaries replaced by a 'new normalcy' (Cheney 2001b ) of nihilistic enemies necessitating appropriately exceptional counter-terrorist measures. In the remainder of this section, we turn now to specific examples of these as subsequently enacted on both sides of the Atlantic. This effort to re-establish control upon a background of uncertainty was enhanced by a parallel, multifaceted, attempt to more tightly manage the movements of individuals. In the first instance, entrance into these two states became increasingly difficult with the Bush that data may be retained for longer than they otherwise would be, on the ground that their retention is necessary for the purposes of safeguarding national security, but that the data may then be accessed for a variety of collateral public purposes which have no connection (direct or indirect) with national security (cited in Privacy
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Counter-terrorism from below
As we have seen, the construction of a new global environment of increased unpredictability, disorder and risk was responded to by the US and UK executives through a multifaceted attempt to further manage the flows of information and bodies into, out of, and within their borders. In themselves, these developments were perhaps unsurprising:
invocations of exceptionality have long been linked both to the forging of exceptional security policies, and to the centralisation of political power within executive agencies.
Perhaps less predictable, however, were the contemporaneous efforts of each state to construct new security mechanisms for countering terrorism 'from below': at the level of the polity. The remainder of this section introduces key examples of these measures, charting the enhancement of citizen obligations to collect information, prepare themselves and their dependents, and otherwise contribute to the security of others in this 'new' era of terrorism.
Amongst the many controversial initiatives to follow 9/11, the ill-fated Operation TIPS seems to stand out as particularly prescient for subsequent occurrences. This Terrorism If these generalised and targeted calls for public vigilance sought to mobilise an army of willing citizen-siphons, other DHS initiatives seemed predicated on a model of citizenscouts characterised by a preparedness for participation in the provision of national and local security where required. At times, professional bodies from the public and private 'School pupils become counter terrorism officers for the day'.
A related movement towards enhanced citizen participation in this policy area can be found in the upsurge of US and UK community-based counter-terrorism initiatives (see Spalek & Imtoual 2007 , Spalek, & Lambert 2008 , Klausen 2009 . These have overwhelmingly targeted those populations deemed host to specific, internal, 'suspect' communities (see inevitably means that some of our counter terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community. That is the reality of the situation, we should acknowledge that reality and then try to have as open, as honest and as transparent a debate with the community as we can.
As Spalek & Imtoual (2007, p.193) emphasise, surveillance practices of this form are increasingly being cast as a responsibility of citizenship:
it might be argued that Muslims' responsibilities as active citizens have increasingly been framed by anti-terror measures which encourage internal community surveillance so that the responsible Muslim citizen is expected to inform the authorities about the activities, suspicious or perceived to be suspicious, of their fellow community members, and to actively help deal with any potential extremism.
Turning, finally, to the British CONTEST 2 strategy with which we began, still further evidence for the continued appeal of this 'bottom-up' approach to counter-terrorism emerges. This strategy called for further anti-terrorism training for 'ordinary' citizens to supplement that hitherto received by sixty thousand people throughout the UK. Under this programme, the citizenry's counter-terrorism responsibilities were extended still further:
stretching now even beyond recognising, preparing for, and reporting on potential, emergent, threats. Now, (certain) citizens were expected to participate in responding to future terrorist attacks: an obligation that blurred any distinction between the providers and recipients of security still further. As the Prime Minister noted on the strategy's release:
Today, not only the police and security and intelligence officers and our armed forces, but also the emergency services, local councils, businesses and community groups are involved in state-of-the-art contingency planning. Tens of thousands of men and women throughout Britain -from security guards to store managers -have now been trained and equipped to deal with an incident and know what to watch for as people go about their daily business in crowded places such as stations, airports, shopping centres and sports grounds (Brown 2009 ).
Stakeholder Security
Within the existing literatures on contemporary counter-terrorism, discussions around risk management offer a potentially useful inroad into understanding the 'bottom up' developments traced above. Interest in this risk management framework emerges, in part, from the prominent role of discourses of unpredictability in the counter-terrorism field.
Claims to the unknowable, unpredictable, character of our new terrorist foes have, of course, been central to justifying post-9/11 policy responses, with figures such as Paul Wolfowitz (2001) regularly asserting our need to 'prepare ourselves for the virtual certainty that we will be surprised again'. Donald Rumsfeld (2002) , more famously, invoked the existence of: known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns -the ones we don't know we don't know.
Claims, such as these, to the omnipresence of uncertainty in the counter-terrorism field immediately call forth Ulrich Beck's (1992 Beck's ( , 1999 Beck's ( , 2002 notion of the global risk society.
While the appeal of this appears obvious in light of the above comments, Beck's emphasis on the objectivity of risk has been appropriately critiqued (Aradau & van Munster 2007, p. 96). For Aradau and Munster (2007) , these mechanisms are therefore better understood as an exercise in precautionary risk management: a framing that points to the precariousness of particular designations of risk, and elite justifications for action in the face of (constructed) unknowable dangers. Viewed thus, claims to the existence, scale, and appropriate responses to, particular risks emerge as part of a broader contest over representation.
The 'top-down', executive, efforts to manage threat definitions, bodies and information against an insecure backdrop certainly appear to fit this conceptualisation of policy formulation as an exercise in precautionary risk management (see also Burke 2002 , Kessler & Daase 2008 , Kittelsen 2009 ). In terms of the 'bottom up' initiatives of the new topography, however, this approach appears rather less complete. Discussions of risk management, and its connotations of calculative decision-making (see Amoore and de Goede 2008) , suggest an approach to counter-terrorism that is both quantitatively organised, and undertaken by experts. These discussions imply, put otherwise, that terrorism is fought by those with sufficient access to relevant intelligence; an ability to interpret this information appropriately; and a designated authority from which to act. Yet, as we have seen, the contemporary Western way of counter-terrorism extends far beyond the immediate decisions of executive agencies and their subordinates. Governance, in this arena, has been diffused right throughout the social: to the homes, lives and work of 'ordinary' individuals and communities. To further understand the involvement of these actors, then,
we introduce now our notion of stakeholder security.
By way of introduction, let us first note that the contemporary appeal to citizen vigilance and participation in security provision is, in one sense, not at all new. James Hay (2005) As with the governmentality literature, these discussions of individual responsibilisation seem to capture the shifting emphasis towards individual provision of one's own welfare.
Yet, as we have suggested, contemporary 'bottom-up' efforts at countering terrorism from below appear to rely on a still broader appeal to obligation even than this. Individual citizens have increasingly been called on to take responsibility not only for the security of themselves and of their families: by preparing emergency kits, plans and so forth. But also, importantly, to take responsibility for the security of one's community understood in a far broader sense. In Tom Ridge's framing, indeed, citizens are now responsible even for the security and wellbeing of future generations.
As the range of subjects to whom ordinary individuals are responsible for helping to secure has broadened, so the pressure for responding to this call has intensified. With participation in counter-terrorism mechanisms viewed increasingly as a social commitment, citizens are obligated -not merely expected -to contribute to the national security project in specific ways. One recent UK government report on community interventions, for example, expressed its frustration that, 'they are unable to get some partners to engage, particularly in achieving interventions' (Daily Telegraph 2009). A British woman was also recently brought to trial for failing to inform the authorities of her husband's preparations to engage in terrorist activities (BBC News 2010). Although the individual was acquitted, the bringing of this charge indicates the importance of these assumptions regarding social responsibility:
the costs of failing to participate in countering terrorism are here deemed fully social, not merely individual.
In order to better understand these developments, and to shift analytical emphasis from the risky individuals and behaviours explored in the risk management and responsibilisation literatures, we propose that contemporary citizen-led counter-terrorism strategies be understood as an effort in establishing a model of stakeholder security. This term, we suggest, more precisely captures the construction of social responsibilities that underpins the recent developments detailed above, and the importance of these constructions for their public legitimisation. Although the term stakeholder is characterised by connotative contestability -it 'means many different things to many different people' (Phillips et al 2003, p.479 ) -its widening in general usage has proved productive in extending its applicability far beyond Freeman's (1984) path-breaking discussion of a particular style of corporate management. If Kelly et al (1997, p.238) are correct in arguing that, 'Almost everything, it seems, has a stakeholder dimension: stakeholder capitalism, stakeholder 21 Stakeholder Security government, stakeholder Europe, stakeholder society, stakeholder economy', we here seek to highlight a similar dimension in security policy. In so doing, we follow Will Hutton's (1997, p. 3) attachment of stakeholding to inclusion, such that: '…a stakeholder society and a stakeholder economy exist where there is a mutuality of rights and obligations constructed around the notion of economic, social and political inclusion' (Hutton 1997, p. 3).
Hutton's attachment of stakeholding to inclusion appears immediately pertinent to the new counter-terrorism topography sketched at this article's outset. As we have seen, the increased willingness of political elites to claim ignorance of potential, emerging, or imminent dangers has worked to legitimise non-elite involvement in counter-terrorism programmes. With these programmes justified not by a limited availability of reliable intelligence, but rather by the very absence of reliable knowledge, new practices and behaviours are increasingly expected of citizens to supplement, or somehow 'fill', these 'gaps'. Responsibility for the combating of terrorism and the associated provision of security now stretches across the social: infiltrating, and linking, national, community and individual levels of social interaction.
The stakeholder approach to countering terrorism is predicated, then, on an appeal for inclusion across distinct, if linked, spheres of social activity. It should be noted that the inclusion sought (expected, even), however, is of a very particular kind. Participation in these counter-terrorism projects is demanded from citizens in order to correct the limits or failures of the national security architecture. Our participation is called forth, put otherwise, to deliver what the state is, simply, unable to provide. Citizens are therefore included in the delivery or provision of security as a shared public good, where the desirability and
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Stakeholder Security contents of this good are presumed to be already established. As Alistair Darling (1997, p.11-12) suggested in an earlier context:
We look to the government to do those things that we cannot do ourselves, but the government itself does not always have to provide the services, or the delivery mechanisms. Public provision is effective in some cases, in others it is less so…It is not a conflict between public and private; both government and private sector have different roles to play; indeed, they are dependent on each other; there is a partnership between them. (Darling 1997, p. 11-12 , emphasis added)
If we return to Tom Ridge's comments above, the form of citizen-involvement envisaged in the contemporary counter-terrorism arena clearly accords with Darling's emphasis on the delivery of established ideals. What these programmes appear not to foster is a rather different form of inclusion based on deliberation and agential participation. In this sense, the contemporary stakeholder security paradigm eschews republican approaches to stakeholding rooted in notions of authorship and participation. Instead, it promotes a communitarian-inspired approach to the citizen-stakeholder as a participant in only the delivery, not the authorship, of public goods. Seen in this way, evolving approaches to counter-terrorism may be viewed as an extension of broader socio-political developments, where, 'The more powerful and radical stakeholder idea…has faded away fast while the communitarianism of personal responsibility has continued to be pursued' (Driver & Martell 1997, p.42) . As such, the movement towards a new topography of security is couched in terms of 'our' need to contribute to the enhancement of security as a truly public good. Participation in these new mechanisms, put otherwise, is not requested because we, as individuals, will be safer for their existence. Rather, (or as well), it is requested, because in so doing we will also increase the security of those around us. As a recent Metropolitan Police advertisement for the new Anti-Terrorist Hotline summarised against an image of a bustling suburban street: 'A bomb won't go off here because weeks before a shopper reported someone studying the CCTV cameras' (Metropolitan Police Undated).
Stakeholder Security
This call for public participation in the provision of security places considerable responsibilities on the citizen. In the first instance, to participate appropriately citizens are expected to possess a literacy of this new climate of (in)security. Here, ordinary individuals are to be capable of recognising those behaviours that potentially endanger themselves and others; to know whom to contact under such circumstances; and to be able to access the pertinent central sites of governance appropriately through the dialling of telephone hotlines or the completion of anonymous Internet forms. In addition, citizens are further expected to be active in responding to attacks should they occur. It has become a civic obligation to contribute to, and participate in, the monitoring of others such that oneself and one's others will benefit from enhanced security. And, the import of this obligation trumps, it would seem, any possible uncertainty we may experience in the fulfilment of these new roles.
Again, to reiterate, as an earlier Metropolitan Police (2008) radio advertisement stated:
'You don't have to be sure. If you suspect it, report it'.
This reliance on ordinary citizens for counter-terrorism indicates, we suggest, a refashioning of both the agents and sites from which security emanates. At the level of the individual, it also introduces a considerable ambiguity. Now, the contemporary citizen has become at once a subject, a potential object, and a technology of security policy. In the first instance, as a stakeholder likely to benefit from enhanced national and local security, the citizen is positioned as a beneficiary of this new topography of security measures. As a shopper, or a temporary dweller of crowded spaces, for example, the contemporary citizen appears to enjoy the protection of these new mechanisms: she is the referent meriting securing both as an individual and as part of her broader social groupings. Second, paradoxically, the citizen has also increasingly become a potential object of these security While activist citizens engage in writing scripts and creating the scene, active citizens follow scripts and participate in scenes that are already created. While activist citizens are creative, active citizens are not (Isin 2008, p.38) It may be, therefore, that whilst citizens are called upon to participate and be active in security politics, that, as the scripts are already written the capacity for agency and engagement, and ultimately, the capacity for citizenship, is heavily circumscribed. In this vein, we might profitably distinguish between a more communitarian flavoured stakeholder approach to security being presently pursued on the one hand. And, on the other, a more radical, republican, form that would involve individuals in the writing of scripts beyond the simple performance of pre-given roles. Whether either form of stakeholder security can be successful in providing security for citizens remains to be seen.
Conclusion
In this article, we have identified the emergence of a relatively coherent approach to antiterrorism policy in the US and UK: one oriented around the production of a new topography of security measures. At one level, this topography has been characterised by the two states' executives fashioning new tools for countering this threat 'from above'. At the same time, successive leaderships have also implemented a range of new mechanisms for combating 27 Stakeholder Security terrorism 'from below', at the level of the polity. To conceptualise the increasing reliance on citizens in this area, we introduced the notion of stakeholder security. As we have seen, invocations to participation are frequently made through appeal not to elite expertise or knowledge, but rather the absence of such. As such, stakeholder security calls to mind the 'responsibilisation' of individuals identified in other domains, but goes further, as that which is sought is not an individual good, but a public one: the security of the wider community and society. Concomitantly, the obligation to participate in the provision of such security is cast in increasingly strident terms, becoming, in some instances, the key responsibility of citizenship. This diffusion of responsibility precariously positions the citizen simultaneously as a subject to be secured; a threat from which to be secured; and a technology of security. 
